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l\ JURISDICTION 
The court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(3)(j). 
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW, AUTHORITY, AND 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN RECORD 
1. Whether the trial court erred in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final 
Order entered September 16,2002, in determining that no issues of material fact exist 
as to when appellant Nancy Steen Adams knew, or had reason to know, of the claims 
she has advanced against Mi Vida and Mark Steen, and in dismissing the majority of 
1 
her claims based on expiration of the statute of limitations. 
a. Standard of Review. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether the trial court correctly 
found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, the facts and inferences 
are to be accepted in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving] party. 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). In deciding 
whether the trial court correctly granted judgment as a matter of law, the 
appellate court gives no deference to the trial court's view of the law, and 
reviews it for correctness. SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett 28 
P.3d 669, 673-74 (Utah 2001). 
b. Authority. The relevant citations to this issue are Rules 9(h) and 56(a) and (f), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Faussett v. American Resources Management 
Corp., 542 F.Supp. 1234 (D.C. Utah, 1982); Wasatch Mines Company v. 
Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2d 70, 465 P.2d 1007 (1970); American Theater Co. v. 
Glasmann, 95 Utah 305.80 P.2d 922 (1938): Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 
P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992); Lowrv v. Lowrv, 590 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. App. 1992); 
Snortland v. State, 615 N.W.2d 574, 578 (N.D. 2000); LeBrun v. D.W. 
Connor, Jr., 702 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. 1998). 
c. Preservation of issue in record. These issues were preserved in the record by 
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the parties briefings, particularly, Nancy Steen-Adams' Memorandum Brief 
In Response to Motion For Summary Judgment, TCR 2706-2739. 
Whether the trial court erred in its December 3, 2002, order by certifying as final 
under Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Final Order entered by the trial court on September 16,2002, dismissing 
the majority of appellants' claims. 
a. Standard of review. Whether an order is eligible for certification under Rule 
54(b) is a question of law which the Appellate Court reviews for correctness. 
UTCO Associates. Ltd. v. Zimmerman, 27 P.3d 177 (Utah App. 2001). 
b. Authority. The relevant citation to this issue are Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 1099 
(Utah 1991); Bennion v. Pennzoil Co.. 826 P.2d 137, 139 (Utah 1992). 
c. Preservation of issue in record. These issues were preserved in the trial court 
record through the pleadings. 
Whether the trial court erred in finding that Appellants abused process, brought their 
claims in bad faith, and/or in violation of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 11(b), with 
respect to their claims for dissolution and receivership brought in Colorado. 
a. Standard of review. Questions of common law and statutory interpretation are 
reviewed for correctness. Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 
1992); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). 
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Whether Appellants abused the civil process or acted in bad faith are 
questions of fact, and are therefore reviewed for clear error. The standard of 
appellate review for mixed questions of law and fact is abuse of discretion. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-39 (Utah 1994). 
b. Authority. The relevant citations to this issue are Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 11(b); § 78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated; Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003); Gilbert v. Ince. 981 P.2d 
841 (Utah 1999); Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, 519 P.2d 888 (Utah 1974); 
Keller v. Rav, Ouinnev & Nebeker, 896 F. Supp. 1563 (D. Utah 1995); Cadv 
v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983); Jesche v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah 
App. 1991); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682. 
c. Preservation of issue in record. These issues were preserved in the trial court 
record through testimony and argument. 
4. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Appellants did not have reasonable cause 
to bring their derivative claims in Colorado. 
a. Standard of review. Issues of statutory interpretation present questions of law 
that the appellate courts review for correctness. Hansen v. Eyre, 74 P.3d 1182, 
1185 (Utah 2003); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 
1999); Tavlor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999). 
b. Authority. The relevant derivative shareholder statute citation is § 16-
4 
10a-740, Utah Code Annotated. There is no Utah case law interpreting the 
"without reasonable cause" language of the Utah derivative shareholder 
statute § 16-10a-740, U.C.A. How this standard is interpreted is a matter of 
first impression in Utah, 
c. Preservation of issue in record. These issues were preserved in the trial court 
record through testimony and argument. 
5. Whether the trial court erred in determining that Utah law applied to claims brought 
by Appellants in Colorado rather than Colorado law. 
a. Standard of review. The trial court's choice of law is reviewed for 
correctness. Shawn v. Lavton Constr. Co., 872 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah App. 
1994). 
b. Authority. The relevant citations to this issue are Waddoups v. Amalgamated 
Sugar Co., 54 P.3d 1054, 1059 (Utah 2002); Trillium USA, Inc. v. Board of 
County Com'rs of Broward County, Florida, 37 P.3d 1093, 1096-97 (Utah 
2001); The Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws §§ 299-310. 
c. Preservation of issue in record. These issues were preserved in the trial court 
record through testimony and argument. 
1. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to find that Mark Steen and Mi Vida 
breached the fiduciary duties they owed to Nancy Steen-Adams and awarded 
attorneys fees and costs in excess of $250,000 against Nancy Steen-Adams. 
5 
a. Standard of Review. This is a mixed question of law and fact which the 
appellate courts review for an abuse of discretion. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 
71 P.3d 188, 202 (Utah App. 2003); Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 
892 (Utah 1996); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 
1998); Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1198 (Utah 1993); J.V. Hatch 
Constr., Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8, 13 (Utah App. 1998). 
b. Authority. The relevant citations to this issue are Nicholson v. Evans, 642 
P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1982); Branch v. Western Factors, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 361, 
502 P.2d 570 (1972); 4447 Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin., 889 P.2d 467,471 (Utah 
App. 1995). 
c. Preservation of issue in record. These issues were preserved in the trial court 
record through testimony and argument. 
VI. STATUTES 
The primary statute that underlies al of the arguments on appeal is Utah's derivative 
shareholder statute, U.C.A. §16-10a-740. Utah has not yet determined what standard a 
shareholder is held to in bringing derivative claims against directors of a corporation with 
facts alleging claims such as breach of fiduciary duty, as alleged in this case. 
VIL STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
B. Procedural History 
The Steen family found great wealth mining uranium in the early 1950?s in 
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southeastern Utah. Unfortunate circumstances led to bankruptcy by 1968, and the family 
members - Charles Steen, Sr. ("Charles Sr."), his wife Minnie Lee Steen ("M.L. Steen"), 
and their four sons, Charles Steen, Jr. ("Charles Jr."), Andrew Steen ("Andy"), John Steen 
("John"), and Mark Steen ("Mark") - have been fighting over what was left of the family 
fortune for decades. Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. ("Mi Vida"), was the entity formed to hold 
the assets that remained after the bankruptcy proceedings terminated, in which each of the 
family members initially held a one-sixth interest. Due to a debilitating head injury suffered 
by Charles Sr. in 1971, the death of M.L. Steen in 1997, John Steen's lack of participation, 
and other circumstances, Mark Steen has been the controlling director and shareholder of 
Mi Vida. 
In 1999, a group of minority shareholders of Mi Vida commenced a derivative action 
in Boulder County District Court (the "Colorado action") against Mi Vida, Mark Steen, 
Charles Steen Sr., John Steen, and the several Colorado companies Mark had created 
alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duties as directors of Mi Vida, and requesting an 
accounting, dissolution, receivership, and a declaratory judgment. Trial Exhibit B-l. 
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on several arguments including 
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as Mi Vida is a Utah corporation. The 
motion was denied on November 10, 1999. Addendum Exhibit 1; Trial Exhibit 4501. 
Citations in this brief are abbreviated as follows: TCR is the Trial Court Record 
where the court clerk assigned each page a number in pencil. Trial Exhibits are those 
exhibits used at trial that remain in notebooks and are tabbed accordingly. The Addendum 
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Subsequently, a joint motion and renewed motion to dismiss was filed by Mark Steen, Mi 
Vida and others. Thereafter, three plaintiffs who had filed for bankruptcy protection before 
the Colorado action had been filed, Charles Steen Jr., his wife Jayne, and Monica Steen, 
were dismissed for lack of standing. The joint motion was denied as to the other plaintiffs 
including Nancy Steen-Adams ("Nancy") and Charles Steen III, who were permitted to 
proceed with their action except for the request for dissolution. Addendum Exhibit 2; Trial 
Exhibit 451. 
Mi Vida then filed its complaint in Grand County District Court, Utah, on March 28, 
2000, against the plaintiffs in the Colorado action asserting claims seeking to buyout the 
dissident shareholders, to enjoin them from pursuing their action in Colorado, and alleging 
damages, fees and costs for wrongfully pursuing the Colorado action. TCR 1-34. On April 
12,2000, the Utah trial court agreed with Mi Vida and ruled that the Colorado plaintiffs are 
barred from pursuing dissolution, receivership, and any claims against Mi Vida in Colorado 
that involved Utah assets and activities. It also ruled the Colorado plaintiffs could maintain 
their claims in Colorado that involved Colorado assets and activities. TCR 92-100. 
The parties subsequently stipulated to dismissing the action in Colorado and bringing 
all of the claims into the Grand County, Utah jurisdiction. TCR 3693,11. 7-19. The Utah 
plaintiffs then moved to have Charles III and Andrew Kirk Steen, Jr. ("Kirk") dismissed 
Ex. citations correspond to the tabbed addendum documents submitted to the Court of 
Appeals along with this brief. The line references ("1." or "11.") correspond to the lines of 
a page. 
8 
from the case for lack of standing as their interests were ruled inchoate as the shares 
bequeathed to them in Mi Vida from their late grandmother, M.L. Steen, were still in probate 
and had not yet been distributed (and still have not as Mark Steen is the personal 
representative). The court found Charles III and Kirk lacked standing and dismissed their 
counterclaims against Mark Steen in a ruling dated November 6,2001 (TCR 1132-34), but 
kept jurisdiction over Charles III for claims against him for potential set-off against any 
shares he may receive in the future under the will of M.L. Steen. Addendum Exhibit 4, p. 
7, 11. 5-8; TCR 3695. 
The Utah plaintiffs including Mi Vida, Mark Steen, and John Steen, jointly moved 
for summary judgment based on a statute of limitations defense to dismiss the counterclaims 
of Nancy Steen-Adams asserted in the Utah action. That motion was granted on July 10, 
2002 and the order was entered September 16? 2002 as to the derivative claims involving the 
Boulder County real property alleged to have been owned by Mi Vida. Addendum Exhibit 
3; TCR 3042-65. The trial court then certified the summary judgment order as final in an 
order entered December 3, 2002. TCR 3275-78. Appellants have appealed those two orders. 
Nancy Steen-Adams was left to litigate the remaining claims which were tried to the 
bench on April 14-16,2003, and May 21-23,2003. The claims remaining for trial included: 
valuation and buyout of the shares of Mi Vida; Nancy's derivative claims against Mark and 
Mi Vida including breach of fiduciary duties by Mark Steen for his failure to provide an 
accounting of Mi Vida, failure to hold shareholder meetings, usurping corporate 
9 
opportunities, using Mi Vida funds to purchase assets, and attorney fees under the Utah 
derivative statute based on breach of fiduciary duty common law. 
At the end of trial, the court found that the value of shares in Mi Vida owned by 
Nancy Steen-Adams was $261,086.88. TCR 2734. The court also found that Nancy brought 
her claims in Colorado for an improper purpose and without reasonable cause, and similarly 
abused the judicial process by bringing her claims in Utah and ordered her to pay attorney 
fees and costs of Mi Vida and Mark Steen for defending her claims and other matters in the 
amount of $329,710. These findings are also a part of this appeal. 
C. Factual History 
In 1951, Charles Steen, Sr. ("Charles Sr.") discovered what is believed to be the 
biggest uranium deposit ever unearthed in the United States. With the incredible wealth 
derived from the mining activities, the Steen family invested in diverse businesses that 
eventually led to financial trouble and Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 1968. Addendum 
Exhibit 1, p. 2; Trial Exhibit 450. 
The closely held Steen family corporation, Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc., was formed to 
hold the assets that remained following the bankruptcy proceedings. Those assets included 
real property interests in the Gold Hill area of Boulder County, Colorado, and in Grand 
County, Utah. The properties were encumbered by multiple mortgages and an IRS tax lien, 
and as a result were essentially worthless for many years. Addendum Exhibit 4, p. 7; TCR 
3695. 
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In 1971, Charles Sr. suffered a serious head injury that resulted in his inability to 
conduct his business and personal affairs. Additionally, Charles Sr. began to suffer with 
Alzheimer's disease in the mid 1990fs rendering him totally incompetent. Mark Steen has 
conducted the affairs of his father since 1971. Id. In 1997, Mark's mother, M.L. Steen, 
passed away and Mark became the personal representative of his mother's estate. Further, 
Mark controls the business affairs of his brother, John. It is because of these circumstances 
that Mark Steen has been the controlling director and shareholder of Mi Vida. Addendum 
Exhibit 1, pp. 2-4; Trial Exhibit 450. 
Appellant Nancy Steen-Adams was a minority shareholder of Mi Vida, a Utah 
corporation with its principal place of business in Boulder County, Colorado, with 250,000 
shares of Mi Vida. Nancy acquired her shares through her divorce from Charles Jr. 
Appellant Charles III is a putative devisee of shares of Mi Vida representing approximately 
1.67% of the company. Charles III was bequeathed shares in Mi Vida through the will of 
his late grandmother, M.L. Steen. Addendum Exhibit 1, pp. 2-3; Trial Exhibit 450. M.L. 
Steen's estate has been stuck in probate for years and the bequests have yet to be fulfilled. 
Shareholder meetings of Mi Vida have been held sporadically throughout the years 
of the company's existence, and no shareholder meetings have been held since 1994. In 
1993 the IRS tax lien expired and Mi Vida became an entity holding assets with significant 
value. Addendum Exhibit 4, p. 11,11. 1-6; TCR 3699. 
In 1998, a group of minority shareholders of Mi Vida, including Nancy Steen-Adams 
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and Charles Steen III, became aware of at least one newspaper article that mentioned land 
transactions were taking place between Colorado companies controlled by Mark Steen and 
another entity named ITEC Environmental involving real property interests in the Gold Hill 
area of Boulder County, Colorado. When the minority shareholders requested an accounting 
from Mark Steen for Mi Vida, key documents were not produced. Letters requesting 
accounting were written on three occasions from December 18, 1998-February 3, 1999. 
Trial Exhibits 391-393. The minority shareholders including Nancy and Charles III filed 
an action in Colorado in July of 1999 against Mark Steen and his group of Colorado 
companies requesting an accounting of Mi Vida, a declaratory judgment regarding diverted 
corporate opportunities, breach of fiduciary duties, review of certain corporate documents 
of Mi Vida, dissolution of Mi Vida, and a request that a receiver be appointed. Trial Exhibit 
B-l, also see Addendum Exhibit 1, p.4; Trial Exhibit 450. 
On May 2, 2001, three Colorado companies controlled by Mark Steen entered into 
a purchase agreement with the County of Boulder, where the county would pay $2,550,000 
in consideration for real property consisting of patented and unpatented mining claims 
located in the Gold Hill area of Boulder County. In early May, 2001, Boulder County paid 
$2,700,000 for the property described in the Boulder County Purchase Agreement and some 
additional property. Addendum Exhibit 3, p. 4, 11.22-23, p. 5, 11.1-7;TCR pp. 3045-46. 
A substantial amount of the property sold to Boulder County was originally acquired 
by Mark Steen as agent for some type of business entity where Mi Vida was a joint venturer, 
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partner, or general partner in a limited partnership. Despite Mi Vida's participation in each 
of the entities, no part of the sales proceeds was given or transferred to Mi Vida or Nancy 
Steen-Adams. This alleged diversion of corporate assets and opportunities was the focal 
point of the derivative claims in Colorado and Utah action. 
Appellants also alleged in her complaint that a certain financial instrument which was 
represented by Mi Vida's counsel as bought by Mi Vida out of the bankruptcy court for the 
benefit of the shareholders was actually paid for by Mi Vida but then transferred to Mark 
Steen for no consideration. The fact that Mi Vida could have retired this debt for its own 
benefit but then surreptitiously transferred it to Mark Steen for his benefit, is an opportunity 
that, at a minimum, should have been disclosed to Nancy Steen-Adams. Appellants asserted 
that the transaction was a breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. 
When Mark Steen and Mi Vida moved to dismiss the Boulder case based on lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, Judge Bailin of the Boulder District Court found in favor the 
plaintiffs and denied the motion to dismiss. Addendum Exhibit 1, Trial Exhibit 450. Judge 
Bailin found that the modern trend in the law is to allow dissolution and receivership of a 
foreign corporation, and this corporation fit the bill as most of its contacts were in Colorado. 
Id. In the Utah trial, Mi Vida and Mark Steen prevailed on their claim that the dissident 
shareholders abused judicial process by continuing to pursue dissolution of Mi Vida and 
appointment of receiver in the Boulder court, despite the fact that the preliminary injunction 
order issued by the Utah court did not order that all proceedings in Boulder County were to 
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stop, but allowed the dissident shareholders to maintain their claims against Mark Steen and 
Mi Vida involving actions and properties in Colorado. TCR 171-179. 
By stipulation dated October 13, 2000, the parties agreed to dismiss the claims in 
Colorado and reassert their claims in Utah. TCR 3693,11 7-19. 
In Utah the appellants had their shares valued, and had their other claims dismissed 
or determined to be of insignificant benefit to Mi Vida. Attorneys fees were awarded against 
them. Appellants are appealing their loss of their claim for breach of fiduciary duty and the 
judgments against them for attorneys fees. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Nancy Steen-Adams and Charles Steen III appeal from the September 30,2003 trial 
court order, Addendum Exhibit 4; TCR 3689-3725, awarding attorneys fees against them 
in the amount of $329,710 against Ms. Steen-Adams and $8,950.55 against Charles Steen 
III. The pieces to this appeal consist of a prior appeal of the court's granting of summary 
judgment against Nancy Steen-Adams and dismissal of her claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty relating to transfers of real estate made by Mark Steen. That order, Addendum Exhibit 
3, TCR 3042-3065, was principally based upon the court's finding that Ms. Steen-Adams 
was put on notice and/or should have inquired about the real estate transfers prior to the 
expiration of her three year statute of limitations. 
In this appeal, Ms. Steen-Adams asserts that the real estate transfers were part of a 
continuing scheme that came to light approximately one year before filing the minority 
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shareholders' initial complaint, thus precluding the running of the statute of limitations. 
Nancy Steen-Adams also appeals the court's certification of the summary judgment order 
as final, as the facts related to the dismissed claims and the facts remaining overlap. 
Although the arguments in this brief are broken out separately, they are complex and 
intertwine. The trial record indicates that Mark Steen breached his fiduciary duties to Nancy 
Steen-Adams by failing to make shareholder distributions to her. Nancy Steen-Adams was 
forced to initiate litigation in Colorado in order to obtain an accounting from Mi Vida as the 
company's principal place of business and transactions were conducted from Mark Steen's 
residence in Boulder County, and Mi Vida assets were located in Boulder County. 
At trial, Mi Vida failed to provide a full accounting - the last two year's tax returns, 
or any of the general ledger entries for the last nine months prior to the valuation date of 
October 12, 2000. This failure of accounting in and of itself is a sufficient basis for Ms. 
Steen-Adams to bring her claim for breach of fiduciary duty and accounting. 
Nancy Steen-Adams proved a breach of fiduciary duty by Mark Steen through his 
acquisition of Charles Steen, Jr.'s interest in the Continental Bank and Trust note and 
mortgage placed upon the Mi Vida property. Mark Steen used Mi Vida funds to buy the Mi 
Vida debt at a discounted rate and in the process obtain credit for the shareholder advances 
Mi Vida had made to Charles Steen, Jr. This conduct could not be explained by Mr. Steen 
or his attorney and constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty such that attorneys fees for the 
derivative claims should not have been awarded against Nancy Steen-Adams for her actions 
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in either Colorado or Utah. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS HAD EXPIRED IN ITS ORDER ENTERED SEPTEMBER 16, 
2002, AS THE BAD ACTS ALLEGED BY THE APPELLANTS WERE 
CONTINUING ACTIVITIES THAT CAME TO LIGHT IN 1998 
In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order dated September 30, 
2002, the Grand County District Court found that most of the derivative claims asserted by 
Nancy Steen-Adams were barred by the statute of limitations as she received or should have 
received notice of real estate transactions from a shareholder meeting or shareholder 
meetings in the late 1980s and/or early 1990's. Addendum Ex. 3, TCR 3042-65. 
In their brief to the court, Mi Vida and Mark Steen conceded that Nancy was entitled 
to benefit as a shareholder from the value of the Boulder County and Grand County 
properties owned by Mi Vida. Id. at p. 4,11. 13-14. The movants argued that Nancy's claim 
that certain properties purchased in 1982 and 1983 in the Gold Hill area of Boulder County 
and titled in Mark Steen's name (the"Cosmos Claims") and other properties purchased in 
the same area in 1990 and titled in Mark's name (the "Little and Rodgers Claims"), which 
were then sold to Boulder County for 2.7 million dollars in 2001 and should also be included 
as assets of Mi Vida, was barred by the statute of limitations. IcL at 4,11. 13-22, p. 5,11. 1-7. 
The court found that Nancy Steen-Adams failed to state in her brief in opposition to 
summary judgment when it was she first became aware of facts supporting a claim against 
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Mark as an officer of Mi Vida. Id. at 11,11. 16-17. The court stated in part: 
The Summary Judgment Motion was accompanied by a detailed statement of 
facts supported by affidavit. Nancy attempted to controvert a number of those 
statements. However, her efforts to do so simply by stating that she disagrees 
cannot be honored.... A party resisting summary judgment is not entitled to 
rest on pleadings, but must come forward with specific averments 
contradicting specific facts asserted by the moving party. 
Id at 2,11. 12-19. 
The court also found that Nancy asserted "that she could not sue until after the 
Cosmos Claims and the Little and Rodgers Claims were sold to Boulder County, but she 
obviously felt aggrieved before that because she filed a lawsuit in Colorado in 1999." Id. at 
11,11.17-20. The court found that there was no genuine issue as to the material fact that the 
statute of limitations expired: 
long before June 8, 19992, because Nancy, with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, based upon knowledge she had or was charged with, would have 
discovered that Mi Vida claimed no interest in those properties and that Mark 
did not hold them in trust for Mi Vida, long before June 8,1996. Mi Vida and 
Mark are therefore entitled to summary judgment excluding those properties 
from the valuation of Nancy's shares. 
Id at 14,11. 9-17. 
The record evidence that supports the trial court's decision is that Nancy hired two 
lawyers, Lynn McKeever and Ann Mosely, who attended the shareholder meeting on May 
2The original Verified Complaint was signed on June 8, 1999, and filed in Boulder 
County District Court on July 6, 1999. 
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2, 1987, on Nancy's behalf. Id. at 5,11. 21-22. At that time, it may have been possible for 
the Nancy to have been put on notice through her lawyers that the Cosmos claims were 
purchased by Mark with money from Cosmos to advance the Gold Hill Venture Agreement, 
of which Mi Vida was a partner and contributor of its own properties. Due to the knowledge 
gained at that May 2 meeting, Nancy may be considered on notice, due to the animosity and 
accusations at that meeting between the Steen family members, that perhaps some 
skullduggery was afoot, and the clock began to run on her claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 
The trial court does not acknowledge, however, that Nancy Steen Adams states in her 
affidavit attached to her brief in opposition to summary judgment that: 
I did not become aware that Mark Steen had formed or improperly used Gold 
Hill Mines, Inc., Gold Reef Mining Company, Southern Cross Prospect 
Mining Company or Golden Tontine, LLC until sometime after M.L. Steen 
dies on July 14, 1997. 
TCR2682,Tf3. 
I was unaware that Mark Steen acted improperly with regard to my stock 
interests in Mi Vida until sometime after M.L. died on July 14, 1997. I have 
never received any distribution or payment from Mi Vida. 
TCR 2682, *h 4. 
These statements by Nancy in her affidavit opposing summary judgment contradict 
assertions made by Mi Vida and are specific averments as to when, perhaps not precisely, 
but generally, she first became aware that new companies had been formed and new 
transactions were being conducted relevant to the properties in Boulder County of which she 
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had an interest. 
The court does take note that Mi Vida is a party to the ITEC transaction which 
involves the Boulder County properties, and that agreement may have value to be shared 
with the shareholders of Mi Vida. Addendum Ex. 1, p. 14,11. 19-21, p. 15.11.1-2. The court 
does not take notice, however, that the ITEC deal underlies all of the claims for relief, and 
therefore because the ITEC transaction was properly pled within the statute of limitations, 
none of the claims should have been dismissed. Id. at 19,11. 16-21. 
Additionally, no shareholder meetings have been held since 1994 and therefore 
Nancy Steen-Adams had no way to gather information regarding any corporate transactions. 
Addendum Ex. 1, p. 19,11. 7-8. Moreover, an accounting was repeatedly requested by the 
minority shareholders beginning in December of 1998 but the critical documents regarding 
the Mark Steen Company transactions and other requested materials were not produced. 
Trial Exhibits 391-393. 
It was the affirmative actions of Mark Steen to deflect the minority shareholders' 
attempts at obtaining information regarding the transactions in the late 1990's involving the 
Mark Steen Companies, Mi Vida, and the Boulder County properties that led to initiating 
the action Colorado in June of 1999. The disclosure of new transactions reported in the 
newspapers was investigated and formal attempts were made by the minority shareholders 
to obtain the relevant information to the ITEC deal and other transactions by way of 
requesting the corporate documents pursuant to Colorado and Utah law. When those 
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requests went unfulfilled, the initial complaint in Boulder County was promptly filed. 
Nancy Steen-Adams was owed a fiduciary duty such that she was not placed on inquiry 
notice by any mailing or activities of Mark Steen. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DECEMBER 3, 2002, ORDER BY 
CERTIFYING AS FINAL UNDER RULE 54(b) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
FINAL ORDER ENTERED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON SEPTEMBER 16, 
2002, DISMISSING THE MAJORITY OF APPELLANT'S CLAIMS. 
On September 16, 2002, the court entered an order dismissing some of the claims 
asserted against Mark Steen and Mi Vida. The claims not dismissed include those related 
to the ITEC Agreement, the claim for breach of fiduciary duties, and the request for an 
accounting. Addendum Exhibit 3; TCR 3042-3065. On October 28,2002, Mi Vida moved 
for an order certifying its September 16 Order as final pursuant to U.R.Civ. Pro. 54(b). TCR 
3128 - 29. After briefing on December 3, 2002, the trial court entered its Order Certifying 
Summary Judgment as Final. Addendum Exhibit 12; TCR 3275-3278. 
Rule 54(b) allows certification "only upon an express determination by the court that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." 
The rule further provides that "[i]n the absence of such determination and direction, any 
order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action 
as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights 
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and liabilities of all the parties.11 Id. 
The court's certification was a waste of judicial resources as the final judgment did 
not dispose of any single claim or party. See Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
814 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1991) (f'[w]hen this factual overlap is such that separate claims 
appear to be based on the same operative facts or on the same operative facts with minor 
variations, they are held not to constitute separate claims for rule 54(b) purposes"); see also 
Briggs v. Valley Spas, Inc., 2001 WL 1636757 (Utah App. 2001) (unpublished decision) 
("due to the factual overlap of the claims remaining before the trial court and those asserted 
on appeal, the trial court improperly granted certification under rule 54(b)"). 
Several claims remain in this case which stem from the same facts upon which the 
dismissed claims are based. For example, the court has dismissed the claim for breach of 
fiduciary duties which asserts a diversion of real property away from Mi Vida. However, 
other fiduciary duties which are alleged to have been breached and have not been dismissed 
include failure to communicate with the shareholders, failure to provide the shareholders 
with certain financial information, including an accounting, failure to convene shareholder 
and director meetings, corporate waste, self dealing by Mark Steen, and devaluation of the 
company. There is much factual overlap between the issues relating to the alleged diversion 
of real estate, and the failure to apprise or receive approval from the shareholders for Mi 
Vida's intention to engage in certain corporate transactions which involved those same 
assets. 
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In order to facilitate this court's review of judgments certified as final 
under rule 54(b), trial courts should henceforth enter findings 
supporting the conclusion that such orders are final. The findings 
should explain the lack of factual overlap between the certified and 
remaining claims and thus satisfy the Kennecott criterion for 
certification to be proper. 
Bennion v. Pennzoil Co.. 826 P.2d 137, 139 (Utah 1992). 
The court failed to include findings explaining that the issues are separate and there 
is a lack of factual overlap between the certified claims and the remaining claims. Here, the 
separate claims were based on many of the same operative facts and therefore should not 
have been certified. 
The trial court awarded Mi Vida and Mark Steen the full amount of the attorney fees 
incurred during the period October, 2000 to April 2003. Addendum Exhibit 4, p. 35; TCR 
3723. The award includes time spent by Mr. Finch discussing and reviewing the issues 
relating to the Rule 54(b) request for certification and briefing. Those amounts consist of 
approximately $1,855.00 in charges approximately one half of which appears to be related 
to the Rule 54(b) request. See plaintiffs Exhibit A-5, Exhibit A, October, 2002 bill for the 
27th and 28th; November bill for the 13th and 22nd; January, 2003 bill for 2nd, 3rd, 27th and 30th; 
February, 2003 bill for the 28th; March, 2003 bill for the 6th and 31st. Also see Exhibit B. 
Additional amounts were awarded to Mi Vida. in its defense of the derivative claims 
in the amount of $103,467. Addendum A, p. 34; TCR 3722. Although it is more difficult to 
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trace said amount it appears that on November 19,2002, Ms Kennedy billed $435 for "Draft 
Reply on 54(b) request, revise Response to Motion to File S.J." Trial Exhibit A-6. 
The bills make it hard to discern precisely how much time was spent on the Rule 54 
appeal; nonetheless, the appeal was improvidently granted and approximately half of said 
fees should be subtracted from the Mi Vida judgment. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT NANCY STEEN-
ADAMS AND CHARLES STEEN III HAD AN IMPROPER PURPOSE AND 
LACK OF MERIT IN FILING THEIR ACTION FOR DISSOLUTION AND 
RECEIVERSHIP IN COLORADO AS MI VIDA AND MARK STEEN HAVE 
A SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP WITH BOULDER COUNTY, 
COLORADO 
In its Final Order and Judgment, Addendum Exhibit 4, the trial court found that the 
action filed in Colorado by Nancy Steen-Adams and Charles Steen III for dissolution and 
receivership was brought for an improper purpose and lacked merit and therefore was an 
abuse of the civil process, and the derivative claims were brought without a reasonable basis. 
Addendum Exhibit 4, pp. 28-30; TCR pp. 3716-18. The trial court assessed fees in the 
amount of $60,259.40 ($21,576.17 in fees and costs for Mark Steen + $38,515.70 in fees 
for Mi Vida) against Nancy Steen-Adams for pursuing the Colorado action. Addendum 
Exhibit 4, pp. 33-36; TCR 3721-24. The trial court also assessed fees against Charles Steen 
III in the amount of $4115.35 in pursuit of the Colorado action. 
The trial court found that it was not reasonable and there was an improper purpose 
to file the original action in Colorado. Addendum Exhibit 4, p. 28,11.10-13; p. 30,11.15-16; 
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TCR p. 3716, 3718. The court also found that it was "not reasonable...for Nancy...to claim 
what they did when they filed the lawsuit in mid-1999 seeking liquidation and a receivership 
of this corporation." Addendum Exhibit 4, p. 28,11.10-12; TCRp. 3716. The trial court also 
found that it was not reasonable for Nancy and Charles III to have asserted the derivative 
claims in Colorado. Addendum Exhibit 4, p. 28,11. 14-15; TCR p. 3716. 
At trial, Mi Vida asserted that the minority shareholders abused the civil process in 
bringing the action for dissolution and receivership in Colorado not because those remedies 
were groundless, but because they were allegedly brought in the wrong forum. 
Mi Vida!s position is not that those two claims were brought with no 
grounds, because I think you can look at the statutes, and simply the fact 
that these shareholders were at each others' throats, that that was perhaps 
not groundless. However, it was an abuse of process. Not by virtue of 
bringing those claims, or those causes, but by virtue of bringing them in 
the wrong forum, to defeat Mi Vidafs right to have this buy-out option 
as opposed to a total dissolution. That's our theory on abuse of process 
for those claims themselves. 
Trial Transcript Vol. II, p. 453,11. 2-12. 
The record evidence that supports the trial court's findings includes the fact that Mi 
Vida is a Utah corporation and therefore the Boulder County court may not have had 
jurisdiction over Mi Vida for dissolution, and therefore the request for dissolution should 
have been brought in the district court of the Utah county where the registered agent of the 
corporation is located pursuant to Utah Code of Administration § 16-10a-1431. Trial 
Transcript Vol. I, p. 42; Vol. V, p. 1308-09; Vol. VI, p. 1469. The record evidence that 
24 
supports the trial court's findings is Mi Vida's assertion that "Mi Vida was never given, in 
the context of the Colorado action, the option to simply buy these people out and get rid of 
them." Trial Transcript Vol. I, p. 35,11. 13-15. 
What the trial court did not recognize is that a court can exercise jurisdiction over a 
foreign corporation such as Mi Vida and wind up its affairs if there are 'strong ties to the 
forum, especially where the bulk of corporate assets are located there, the bulk of business 
has been done there, and corporate officers and directors are subject to the court's 
jurisdiction.' Addendum Exhibit l,p. 10; Trial Exhibit450 (quoting Annotation, Dissolving 
or Winding Up Affairs of Corporation Domiciled in Another State, 19 A.L.R.3d 1285-86); 
In Re Application of Dohring, 537 N.Y.S.2d 767, 769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (court 
concluded "jurisdiction to resolve the internal disputes of foreign corporations may be far 
more readily exercised where the corporation's contacts with [the venue] are substantial"); 
Fletcher's Cyclopedia of Corporations § 8579 ("local courts may appoint receivers for the 
property and assets of a foreign corporation located in the state and wind up the affairs of 
such corporation so far as they are within the jurisdiction"). 
Nancy Steen-Adams and Charles Steen III originally filed their claims in Boulder 
County District Court for several reasons. All of the defendants including Mark Steen, 
Charles Steen, Sr., and John Steen lived in Boulder County, Colorado, and the action was 
filed against several Colorado companies owned by Mark Steen, John Steen and others. Mi 
Vida's principal place of business is run out of the home of Mark Steen in Boulder County, 
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and most of the business of Mi Vida was conducted from Boulder. It is these significant 
contacts and obvious convenience that support the decision to file the original action by 
Nancy Steen-Adams and Charles Steen III in Colorado. 
More importantly, it is understandable that two judges in different jurisdictions may 
disagree as to what law applies as to an action regarding the internal affairs of a corporation, 
however, it is illogical to find Nancy Steen Adams and Charles Steen III liable for an abuse 
of process in bringing their action in Colorado where the chief trial judge determined that 
the jurisdiction that the plaintiffs chose had a significant relationship with the corporation 
and was therefore proper. Addendum Exhibit 1. A fair reading of Judge Bailin's opinion 
and reasoning would exonerate Nancy Steen-Adams and Charles Steen III from the 
judgment for attorney fees. 
4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT NANCY STEEN-
ADAMS AND CHARLES STEEN III HAD NO REASONABLE CAUSE TO 
ASSERT THEIR DERIVATIVE CLAIMS AGAINST MI VIDA IN 
COLORADO 
The lynchpin to this case and the basis for most of the award of over $250,000 in 
attorney fees and costs awarded against Nancy Steen-Adams and Charles Steen III is that the 
trial court found they had brought the derivative claims "without reasonable cause" as that 
term is used in the Utah shareholder derivative statute. U.C.A.§ 16-1 Oa-740. The trial court 
found that Mi Vida and Mark Steen are entitled to recover their attorney fees pursuant to 
U.C.A. § 16-1 Oa-740. That statute reads in part: 
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(6) On termination of the derivative proceeding the court may order: 
(a) the corporation to pay the plaintiffs reasonable expenses, including 
counsel fees, incurred in the proceeding, if it finds that the proceeding 
has resulted in a substantial benefit to the corporation; 
(b) the plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, including 
counsel fees, incurred in defending the proceeding, if it finds that the 
proceeding was commenced or maintained: 
(i) without reasonable cause; or 
(ii) for an improper purpose 
U.C.A. § 16-10a-740. 
Utah, like many states, patterned its shareholder derivative statute after the Model 
Business Corporation Act. Nancy Steen Adams and Charles III were unable to locate any 
Utah cases interpreting the "without reasonable cause" language of the Utah shareholder 
derivative statute. 
Other Courts, however, have addressed this precise issue. In White v. Banes, 866 P. 
2d 339 (N.M. 1993), the New Mexico Supreme Court considered issues related to New 
Mexico's shareholder derivative action statute, including an interpretation of the "without 
reasonable cause" language relating to an award of attorney fees. Like Utah, New Mexico's 
shareholder derivative statute is patterned after the Model Business Corporation Act. In 
White, the New Mexico Supreme Court considered application of the subjective test or 
alternatively, a more objective standard akin to an award of attorney fees for unreasonable 
denial of an insurance claim (the reasonably prudent insurer standard). In adopting the 
subjective standard, the White court stated: 
If our purpose in awarding attorney's fees is to protect plaintiffs 
whose suits have a reasonable foundation, we believe the 
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"groundless" test is a better test to pattern the "reasonable cause test" 
after. Thus, if White knew when he filed the action that his 
complaint was without a reasonable foundation, Banes would be 
entitled to attorney's fees. 
Id. at 344. 
Accordingly, under White, for a party to be sanctioned with attorney's fees, a showing 
must be made that "[he or she] subjectively knew at the time the suit was filed that the 
complaint was groundless." Id. at 343.3 
Regardless of which standard applies, in order to obtain fees under this section, the 
entire action must have been brought without reasonable cause. The commentary to the 
Model Business Corporation Act, on which the Utah Act is patterned, indicates that the 
"action" language was purposely chosen: "The test... that the action was brought without 
reasonable cause is appropriate to deter strike suits on the one hand, and on the other hand 
to protect plaintiffs whose suits have a reasonable foundation." 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act 
Ann. § 7.40, at 720; accord Gizzard v. Petkas, 272 S.E. 2d 583 (1980). Because the goal 
was to deter strike suits, but not to chill meritorious suits, the "action" terminology was 
chosen. See, Winner v. Cataldo. 559 So.2d 696, 696 (Fla. App. 1990). 
3
 Other Courts have adopted the objective standard. See for example, Bass v. Walker 
2003 WL 751047 (Tex. App. 2003) (adopting the objective standard that a plaintiff 
acts without reasonable cause if, at the time he brings the suit: (1) plaintiffs claims 
in the lawsuit are not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law; or (2) plaintiff s allegations in the 
suit are not well grounded in fact after reasonable inquiry. 
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5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT UTAH LAW 
APPLIED TO CLAIMS BROUGHT BY APPELLANTS IN COLORADO 
RATHER THAN COLORADO LAW 
The action for dissolution and receivership, and the derivative claims brought by the 
minority shareholders against Mark Steen and Mi Vida were originally brought in Colorado. 
Since Colorado was the forum state, Colorado's choice of law determines the outcome of 
the conflict. Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.. 54 P.3d 1054,1059 (Utah 2002). Chief 
Judge Roxanne Bailin of the Boulder County District Court presided over the Colorado 
action and performed a Colorado choice of law analysis in determining how to handle the 
Colorado action with respect to Mi Vida. Addendum Exhibit 1 pp. 12-14; Trial Exhibit 450. 
Judge Bailin determined that Colorado has the most significant relationship with Mi Vida 
finding: 
all of Mi Vida's corporate officers are Colorado residents and thus 
subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court. Mi Vida's principal place 
of business and corporate records are located in Colorado. Further, 
except for some land located around Moab, Utah, Mi Vida's assets are 
located in Colorado. In particular, many of the events complained of by 
the Plaintiffs involved Mi Vida assets in the form of real property 
located in Colorado. Mi Vida has no corporate office in Utah. 
Essentially, Mi Vida is a Utah corporation in name only. In addition, 
because the court has jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' four other claims, 
it would be redundant and illogical to insist that the Plaintiffs bring suit 
in two different states when the facts giving rise to all the claims are the 
same. 
Addendum Exhibit 1 p. 12, Trial Exhibit 450. 
These facts substantiated Judge Bailin's finding that Mi Vida had the most significant 
relationship with Colorado and therefore Colorado law applied to all of the claims except 
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for the request for dissolution. As to dissolution, Judge Bailin found that Utah law applied 
but that she could determine whether dissolution was warranted, and if not, what alternative 
remedies would be appropriate, and if dissolution was warranted that such an action would 
be ordered to take place in Utah. Addendum Exhibit 1 p. 12-14, Trial Exhibit 450, quoting 
Comment g to Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law § 302 ("it is situations where the 
corporation has little contact with the state of its incorporation that the local law of some 
other state is most likely to be applied"), also citing Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law 
§ 309 (^'Directors' or Officers 'Liability states that the local law of the state of incorporation 
will be applied, except where' some other state has a more significant relationship under the 
principles stated in section 6 to the parties and the transaction, in which event the local law 
of the other state will be applied"). 
The record evidence that supports the trial court's findings includes the fact that Mi 
Vida brought its lawsuit in Utah and therefore Utah may be considered the forum state for 
purposes of the choice of law analysis. Additionally, Mi Vida is a Utah corporation and 
therefore the applicable statute for purposes of dissolution is Utah Code of Administration 
§ 16-10a-1431, which states a dissolution action must be brought in the district court of the 
Utah county where the registered agent of the corporation is located. Trial Transcript Vol. 
I, p. 42; Vol. V, p. 1308-09; Vol. VI, p. 1469. The record evidence also supports the trial 
court's choice of Utah law in that the value of land owned by Mi Vida in Grand County, 
Utah, was appraised at a higher value than the real property interests in Boulder County, 
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Colorado, and therefore an argument can be made that there is also a significant relationship 
with Grand County, Utah. Addendum Exhibit 2; TCR 3703 p. 16,11. 12-13. 
The fatal flaw lies, however, in the trial court's determination that all of the internal 
affairs of Mi Vida could only be brought in Utah rather than allowing the Colorado action 
to continue except for the single action for dissolution, which if found warranted by the 
Colorado court, could have been ordered by the Colorado court to be litigated in Utah. 
It is this difference in opinion between the judges as to choice of law, which is a 
complex issue, that is indicative of the fact that Nancy Steen-Adams and Charles Steen III 
had at least a reasonable basis for bringing their claims in Colorado in the first place. 
The trial court abused its discretion in finding that the appellants did not have 
grounds to base their claims that were brought in Colorado, and awarded attorney fees. 
6. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND THAT MARK 
STEEN BREACHED THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED TO MI VIDA AND 
NANCY STEEN-ADAMS, DISMISSED THE DERIVATIVE CLAIMS AND 
AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS IN EXCESS OF $250,000 
AGAINST NANCY STEEN-ADAMS. 
The dismissal of those claims occurred in two separate procedures. First, most of the 
large dollar claims were dismissed on summary judgment when the court initially ruled in 
favor of Mark Steen and Mi Vida in the court's September 16, 2002, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Final Order, (hereafter Summary Judgment Order) Addendum 
Exhibit 3; TCR pp. 3042-3065, entering partial summary judgment on the Motion of Mi 
Vida, Mark Steen and John Steen to dismiss the claims set out in her pleading filed on 
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January 31, 2001, TCR 512-531. The court in its Summary Judgment Order, Addendum 
Exhibit 3, pp. 10 -14; TCR pp. 3051-3055, found there were no genuine issues of material 
fact such that claims relating to Mi Vida's ownership of certain properties expired long 
before June 8, 1996, the cut-off date for the applicable three year statute of limitations, 
Section 78-12-27, Utah Code, preceding the June 8, 1999 filing of the initial Boulder 
complaint. 
The second dismissal of the balance of the fiduciary claims occurred at the conclusion 
of six days of trial before the court and is largely summarized in the Final Order, Addendum 
Exhibit 4, TCR pp. 3689 to 3725. As will be shown below, Mark Steen breached his 
fiduciary duties in a number of ways. Mark Steen failed to provide an accounting to Nancy 
Steen-Adams; he advanced money to select shareholders and other relatives without 
charging interest, obtaining a promissory note, or determining their ability to repay the 
monies; he failed to hold shareholder meetings after 1994; he failed to properly 
communicate the business of the corporation to Nancy Steen-Adams and he misled the trial 
court and counsel for Nancy Steen-Adams when he personally took an assignment of 
Charles, Jr.'s interest in the Continental Bank and Trust note and mortgage using Mi Vida's 
claims and money. Taken as a whole this conduct constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty by 
Mark Steen such that the trial court had an insufficient basis to render judgment against 
Nancy Steen-Adams and award Mark Steen and Mi Vida attorneys fees and costs in excess 
of $250,000. 
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Mark Steen mismanaged the funds Mi Vida received from the sale of the 3 acres of 
Mi Vida's land in Moab. There is no dispute that Mark Steen was the controlling officer 
and director of Mi Vida from 1990 to present. The IRS lien of approximately three to five 
million dollars expired in 1993. Trial Transcript p. 548. Thereafter, Mi Vida contracted to 
sell 3 acres of its Moab land. The court in its Final Order and Judgment correctly tracks the 
sequence of events and conflicts presented at the time Mi Vida attempted to sell the 
property. Addendum Exhibit 4, pp. 11-13, TCR 3699-3701. The court specifically 
acknowledged that as a result of litigation initiated by Charles Steen, Jr., the parties cut a 
deal where advances or loans to shareholders were made and advances were made to Tera 
Wright, Id. 
So it is hard to fault the corporation for giving a little favorable treatment to 
some shareholders that maybe legally they are not in a strong position, but 
morally, ethically, emotionally you might feel a strong bond to. These are the 
people without whom there probably would have been none of the rest. 
Id. p. 12; TCR p. 3700. 
More specifically the trial court addressed the breach of fiduciary claim and stated: 
It was true that disproportionate advances were made to shareholders in 1994 
and some disproportionate advances of much less magnitude had been made 
before that time; but, Nancy would have known of these if she had paid 
attention to the notice she was given. 
Id. p. 14; TCR p. 3702. 
On August 9,1994, John Henderson, legal counsel for Mark Steen, wrote a letter to 
Bart Bailey, counsel for Charles Steen, Jr. Addendum Exhibit 5, Trial Exhibit 203. In that 
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letter, Mr. Henderson addressed the concerns he had about the failure to pay Nancy any 
funds from the sale of the 3 acres. He stated: 
I feel that I must continue to express concern to the Mi Vida directors and the 
other family members on a number of items. I believe that the disbursements 
made to date, and those made in the future, must be rationalized based on the 
status of the recipient, either as a mortgage holder and/or shareholder and/or 
a contractee. To the extent the disbursements are made to shareholders or 
third parties, the interests of all shareholders must be protected, and all 
shareholders should be treated fairly and in a similar fashion. 
Id. At trial he Mr. Henderson acknowledged that the letter was specifically addressing 
the non-payment of Nancy Steen-Adams. Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill, p. 670 1. 22 - 672 1.5. 
The court, in its Final and Judgment and Order acknowledged that Mi Vida let its 
registration expire, the corporation wasn't in good standing for awhile, it filed its tax returns 
late. Addendum, Exhibit 4, p. 15, TCR 3703. The court concluded "I think those were all 
things that were easily remedied simply by a letter and cooperation of the shareholder. If 
that had been the only complaint this lawsuit would have been disposed of perhaps before 
it was filed." Id. In making that finding, and dismissing those claims, the court simply 
failed to acknowledge the true deadlock that existed in this corporation and its complete 
disregard for Nancy and her rights. At no time would a simple letter ever have sufficed. 
Those simple letters, Trial Exhibits 391, 392 and 393, were written and rejected before the 
initial litigation was filed, and ultimately attached to the original Boulder complaint. 
It is unchallenged that Mi Vida was consistently late in filing its tax returns. 
Ultimately, Summary Trial Exhibit 616, Addendum, Exhibit 7, was admitted. The exhibit 
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tracks the filing of the tax returns, and it was uncontroverted that tax return filings were 
consistently late. Ms Steen-Adams was never provided the tax return for the year ending 
June 30,1999 or year ending June 30,2000, much less, the more current returns. Moreover, 
until she initiated litigation, she was never provided any accounting - general ledger records, 
cancelled checks, bills, et al. after 1994. This is a breach of fiduciary duty. 
The trial court failed to acknowledge the uncontroverted evidence that Mark Steen 
never informed Nancy of what the trial court stated was "the single most crucial event in the 
post-1974 history of Mi Vida Enterprises," - the 1993 expiration of the multi-million dollar 
IRS lien on the Mi Vida real property. Final Order and Judgment, Addendum Exhibit 4, pp. 
10-11; TCR 3698-99. The removal of that lien met that Mi Vida "actually had assets to 
sell." Id. Nancy consistently stated throughout the trial that she never knew about the 
removal of the lien until 1997, around the time M. L. Steen died. Mark Steen admitted that 
he never gave written notice of the removal of the lien because he didn't have her phone 
number or address. Trial Transcript Vol. II, p. 549 11. 1-10. Mark Steen's only response 
to this assertion is that Mark assumed that Charles Jr. told her or that her daughter Monica 
told her. Id. 
Mark Steen's acquisition of the Continental Bank and Trust note and mortgage was 
a breach of fiduciary duty. Mark Steen breached the fiduciary duties he owed to Mi Vida 
and to Nancy Steen-Adams when he used Mi Vida's funds and its attorney to acquire a 
valuable corporate opportunity for himself by acquiring the portion of the Continental Bank 
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and Trust note and mortgage on Mi Vida property owned by Charles Steen Jr. prior to his 
bankruptcy. He acquired the note and mortgage at a significant discount both by reason of 
the valuation he placed on the note and by using Mi Vida's shareholder advances of $32, 
263 to Charles Jr. to further reduce the purchase price. 
The trial court in its Final Order and Judgment, Addendum Exhibit 4, p. 18 - 19; 
TCR pp. 3706 - 07, reviewed the evidence relating to the CB&T note and found: 
that Mr. Sander would have been aware from the reference in the ten minutes 
I heard on October 12, that the deal included the "claims of CAS, Jr. also 
including a mortgage." The only mortgage CAS Jr. had was the Continental 
Bank & Trust mortgage. So if Mr. Sander saw the settlement documents, the 
most appropriate finding here is that Nancy, through her attorney, had an 
opportunity to say we want to benefit from that transaction, and that she 
didn't. 
In so ruling, the court simply fails to appreciate that there was in fact a breach of 
fiduciary duty and that the valuations of the shareholder advances and CBT note should be 
changed. First, there is no evidence that anyone was aware that Mark Steen and not Mi Vida 
was going to make the acquisition. Second, even assuming the court is correct and Ms 
Steen-Adams' attorney Richard Sanders was aware of all the referenced documents, there 
is no reason for Nancy Steen-Adams to acquire the interest as everyone was led to believe 
Mi Vida was acquiring the interest and compromising the claims. 
The acquisition was done, with the trial courts's approval at a status conference and 
oral arguments hearing on, October 12,2000. The 59 page transcript has been made a part 
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of the record on appeal. TRC 3788. Relevant parts of that transcript are appended as 
Addendum Exhibit 10. 
The October 12, 2000 hearing was in part, a result of a motion, brief and proposed 
order filed by Mi Vida on August 9, 2000. Addendum Exhibit 11; TCR 389-402. That 
filing contained no reference to anyone acquiring the CBT note and mortgage. The filing 
requested permission to borrow against Mi Vida land and access to the funds held in the 
registry of the court. The supporting memorandum brief requests registry funds for the 
purpose of buying 241,980 shares of Mi Vida stock. Addendum Exhibit 11 at 395; TCR 
395. It does state: 
Furthermore, negotiations are being conducted with the Trustee for the estate 
of Charles, Jr. and Jayne to resolve any other claims and counterclaims in the 
context of the buy-out. (footnote omitted) It is in the best interest of Mi Vida 
to resolve any and all claims by and between itself and these former 
shareholders. Specifically, Charles, Jr. claimed to own by transfer certain 
mortgages held by Maxine Boyd. 
Id. 396 - 97. 
Ms Kennedy also states: 
Mi Vida asks for these funds to be made available to it for the purchase of the 
shares. ... If the funds are not released, Mi Vida will lose an opportunity to 
acquire the stock and claims formerly owned by Charles, Jr. and Jayne at a 
reasonable value. Clearly the action will inure to the benefit of Mi Vida's 
creditors (including Boyd) and the remaining shareholders. 
Maxine Boyd, upon whose insistence the funds were originally deposited, has 
asked only that the funds be disbursed or withdrawn only for the benefit of Mi 
Vida or to preserve the property of Mi Vida.Id. 397. 
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The memorandum brief makes other broad and non-specific references to 
compromising claims with the trustee in bankruptcy for the estates of Charles, Jr. and Jayne, 
and in footnote 4 estimates "a need for $70,000, based on the amount of claims in the 
Charles, Jr. and Jayne Steen bankruptcy." Id. 399. In its prayer Mi Vida requests access to 
the registry funds "to be used for the purchase of the shares formerly owned by Charles A. 
Steen, Jr. and Jayne Marie Steen in context of a settlement of all claims with their 
bankruptcy trustee." Id. 400. 
Clearly, no reasonable reading of the motion, brief and order would lead any court 
or attorney to believe that anyone other than Mi Vida was going to pay and receive the 
benefit of its bargain. 
The August 9, 2000, motion was heard on October 12, 2000. At that hearing, 
attorney Richard "Chip" Sanders and Kristine Rogers appeared on behalf of Nancy Steen-
Adams and others. Addendum Exhibit 10, pp. 3-5; TCR 3788. Nancy Steen-Adams was 
also present. Id. Cynthia Kennedy and Keith Chiara appeared on behalf of Mi Vida and 
Mark Steen appeared pro se for himself. Jd. p. 7. One of the purposes of the hearing was to 
obtain funds from the court registry to settle with Charles Steen Jr.'s bankruptcy trustee. Id. 
pp. 14-17. 
Mi Vida attorney Cynthia Kennedy described the transaction for the court beginning 
with her discovery that Charles Steen Jr. and Jayne Steen had filed bankruptcy before they 
sued Mi Vida, and as a result, Mi Vida successfully brought a motion to dismiss for lack of 
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standing. Id. pp. 14,11.2 -18. She contacted the bankruptcy trustee and offered to buy out 
the shares previously owned by Charles Jr. and his wife for book value around $26,000, and 
further explained that the purchase was for the benefit of all the other shareholders "because, 
pro rata, they own more of the corporation once those shares come back in." Id. p. 1511.12 -
19. 
Ms Kennedy continued her explanation of the transaction to the court stating at page 
15 line 20: 
20 We have also negotiated with that trustee to 
21 buy out any claims that Charles, Jr. may have against 
22 Mi Vida. And that includes what you may recall as the 
23 wayward conveyance from Maxine Boyd. She had assigned 
24 her claims to Charles, Jr. through some sort of strange 
25 machinations. 
16 
1 THE COURT: Mm-hmm. 
2 MS. KENNEDY: This settlement with that 
3 trustee will then bring those back into our control. 
4 Putting us then in a position where we can deal 
5 directly with Maxine Boyd, as opposed to having to 
6 litigate her conveyance of those — or assignment of 
7 her interests to Charles, Jr. 
8 There also were — there was a mortgage that 
9 Charles, Jr. held on some Mi Vida property. There was 
10 some shareholder advances that had been made. 
11 We did a calculation of all of the various 
12 counterclaims and claims and came up with a compromise 
13 figure, which is around $32,000. So we have around a 
14 $57,000 compromise with the bankruptcy trustee. 
15 Now, we've just reached that in the last 
16 couple of days. 
17 As a matter of fact, I just had the 
18 trustee's final offer to me faxed to your Court this 
19 morning. But it's acceptable to Mi Vida, and we will 
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20 be moving forward on that. 
21 THE COURT: Now, this is - this is for 
22 the -
23 MS. KENNEDY: It purchases the shares of 
24 Charles, Jr. and Jayne, and brings them back into the 
25 corporation. 
17 
1 And it resolves all claims of Charles, Jr. 
2 against Mi Vida, and Charles, Jr. — including Charles, 
3 Jr.'s ownership or assignment of the Maxine Boyd notes. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. And that's for $26,000 -
5 or that's for $57,000 total. 
6 MS. KENNEDY: Yes. 
7 THE COURT: And that includes the 26,000 to 
8 buy out the shares? 
9 MS. KENNEDY: Yes. Exactly. 
10 And we'll get to this later because that's 
11 why we need access to the money, or the funds that are 
12 in the registry of the Court, is to, in part, pay 
13 that — those amounts, and settle those accounts. 
At the October 12,2000 hearing the court heard other evidence relating to the status 
of the claims and borrowing money. Judge Anderson eventually ordered that the money be 
released from the court registry and authorized the corporation to use the money to buy out 
the bankruptcy interests, to pay litigation fees in unrelated cases, and to pay property taxes. 
Addendum Exhibit 10 p. 53,11. 7-15; TCR 3788, p. 53,11. 7-15. 
Both Mark Steen and Mi Vida counsel have evaded a description of the actual 
transaction. At trial, during the first phase, on April 16, 2003, this counsel asked Mark 
Steen about the transaction and whether or not the actual contract for acquisition was 
produced in discovery. He responded that he thought it was produced and admitted that 
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when I asked him about it in deposition he simply referred me to the pleadings in the case. 
Trial Transcript Vol. III. pp. 783 - 84. Mark Steen ultimately described the transaction 
stating that Mi Vida did not have the money to by the asset so he did it personally. Trial 
Transcript Vol. III. p. 786 1. 7 - p. 788 1. 9. 
Ms Kennedy represented Mi Vida in the transaction. Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill, p. 796, 
11.17 - 21. When Mark Steen was asked about the stated valuation of one-fourth of the CBT 
note, he admitted that $60,000 was low because the "note at that time was worth 
considerably more than that." Id. p. 796 11. 3-16. 
The trial court initially understood that the deal was with Mi Vida. Mark Steen 
explained to the court that Mi Vida did not have the money to purchase anything more than 
the stock, and Mark got everything himself. Id. p. 800 1.23 - p. 801 1. 24. Ms Kennedy 
confirmed that no court approved Mark Steen's receipt of the interests as he was 
denominated as the nominee in the original settlement agreement. TCR Vol. Ill, p. 802,1. 
7 - p. 803 1. 14. This representation is directly contradicted by the court's November 15, 
2000 revised order authorizing payment of Mi Vida funds to the bankruptcy trustee in the 
amount of $31,637.62. Addendum Exhibit 6, Trial Exhibit 633. 
According to the Settlement Agreement, between the bankruptcy trustee for Charles 
Steen Jr. and Jayne Steen and Mi Vida, Trial Exhibit 601, Addendum Exhibit 8, at exhibit 
1, page 3, Mi Vida valued a one-fourth interest of the CBT promissory note and mortgage 
at $60,202.76 as of January 19, 1999. That same document on the same page asserts that 
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Charles Steen Jr. owed $32,263 to Mi Vida for shareholder advances as of January 19,1999. 
The Settlement Agreement also transferred two other bankruptcy assets to Mark Steen 
- the claim by debtor, to an assignment of mortgages on Mi Vida from Maxine Boyd, and 
claims that the debtor had against Mi Vida or its officers or directors individually or 
derivatively. Id. 
Mi Vida also claimed that debtor had liability for penalties and taxes incurred by Mi 
Vida, tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty arising out of the commencement 
of a dissolution and receivership action against Mi Vida in Colorado. Mi Vida claimed a set-
off for said amounts. Id. pp. 3-4. 
The Settlement Agreement provided that Mi Vida was to pay the trustee $31,637.62 
in full settlement of the above described claims; the parties also gave and received mutual 
releases. Id. pp. 5-6; and warranted that the representations and covenants of the Settlement 
Agreement were true and correct. Id. p. 7, para. 4.6 
Trial Exhibit 600 (Addendum Exhibit 7) and Trial Exhibit 601 (Addendum Exhibit 
8) were never filed with the trial court or made a part of the record until this counsel 
introduced them at trial on April 16,2003, and questioned Mark Steen about the transaction. 
Trial Transcript Vol. III. pp. 79-810. Ms. Kennedy did not have her copy of the 
documentation and stated that she left that one file "out of 10,000 on my desk, and it was 
the - -1 thought, there's no possible way that this one litigation could come into this issue" 
Id. 79211. 6 - 1 1 . 
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The above described transaction was a fraud upon Mi Vida and its shareholders. 
Contrary to Mark Steen's assertion that it did not have the funds to purchase the CBT note, 
Mi Vida actually obtained a court order and apparently a check for the $31,637.62. 
Addendum Exhibit 6, Trial Exhibit 633. Mark Steen also placed a value on the note of 
approximately $60,000 for a one-fourth interest, and received a setoff for the $32,263 in Mi 
Vida shareholder advances. This appropriation of a corporate opportunity, purchased with 
Mi Vida money and Mi Vida advances is a breach of fiduciary duty which precludes Mi 
Vida or Mark Steen from being awarded attorney fees. 
XL CONCLUSION 
Appellants request that the Court of Appeals review the attorneys fees awarded 
against Nancy Steen-Adams and Charles Steen, Jr. and make a determination that the trial 
court erred in awarding attorneys fees to Mi Vida for anything other than the fees charged 
as a result of discovery abuse. 
Dated this 30^ day of August, 2004. 
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